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Abstract
We use different variations of the canonical bargaining model of
civil war to illustrate why a potential alliance with a third (foreign)
party that affects the probability of winning the conflict can trigger or
prolong an already existing civil war. We explore both political and
economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit con-
sideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for
identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence.
Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a poten-
tially intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more
likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil
wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates. These results
withstand several robustness checks and, overall, show that foreign
influence is a sizable driver of conflict around the world.
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1 Introduction
There is a large and growing recent economic literature on the motives and
consequences of civil wars. The empirical research has focused on diverse do-
mestic determinants like slow income growth, proportion of natural resources,
secondary school attainment (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Collier, Hoeﬄer,
and Sambanis, 2005), income inequality (Sambanis, 2005), poverty (Djankov
and Reynal-Querol, 2008), ethnic polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol,
2005) or even the effect of diseases (Cervellati, Sunde, and Valmori, 2010).
The theory has concentrated on understanding why costly conflicts are not
deterred. The emergence and the effects of information asymmetries, uncer-
tainty and lack of commitment are therefore intensively studied. Yet, a key
feature of civil war is the involvement of foreign governments supporting one
of the sides in conflict.1 The examples are many, even after the end of the
cold war.2 Such interventions are often secretive and indirect and therefore
unlikely to be fully reflected in available data. As an additional difficulty,
many are the ways for foreign states to intervene in civil wars. They can
provide covert encouragement, allow for (and promote) arms transactions,
supply war intelligence and resources, and give sanctuary to rebels or sup-
port a third state that is providing support in the civil war.
1The possibility of foreign influence has typically been overlooked in economic studies.
As a reflection, foreign involvement is not even mentioned in the most recent and influential
economic literature reviews on civil war (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2007; Blattman and Miguel,
2009). However, there is a political science literature on the subject (see Gleditsch (2007)
for a good overview) which we will discuss in detail in section 2.
2Historical examples include U.S support to factions in war in Angola (1972-1980s),
Nicaragua (1980s), Afghanistan (1979-1992), Peru (1980-2000), Congo (1996-1997) or
Liberia (1999–2003), among other examples; France involvement in the Algerian (1991-
2002) or Rwandan Civil Wars; or the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire (1916-1918)
instigated by the U.K. Regan (2000) identifies 89 unilateral foreign interventions into civil
wars between 1944 and 1994; a period where 138 intrastate conflicts took place. In a
recent paper on the economic effects of U.S. interventions, Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and
Satyanath (2010) find that more than 30 % of countries were subject to CIA “successful”
covert interventions between 1947 and 1989. The interventions were “successful” in the
sense that they installed a new leader or preserved the power of an existing one.
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In this paper, we develop an identification strategy to estimate the effect
of foreign intervention on civil war by explicitly modeling the incentives of
a foreign government to intervene abroad. This way, we can also uncover
covert and indirect interventions. We identify the channels through which
intervention of a foreign country can trigger and prolong domestic conflicts
and take our predictions to the data for the case of the U.S. as a potentially
intervening country. Our results show how domestic conflicts are affected
by the political situation in the U.S. and emphasize that the international
dimension of domestic conflicts is very relevant to understand civil wars.
The starting point of the present paper is the canonical bargaining model
of war where war - modeled as a costly lottery - is the outside option in the
bargaining game. The bargaining process might occur during peace but also
during an on-going war. The domestic motive for conflict is the allocation
of the country’s spoils between the incumbent government and the opposi-
tion. In situations with no information or commitment problems (and no
foreign intervention), the government can always propose an allocation that
would deter the opposition from involving in a conflict. The fundamental
assumption for the emergence or continuation of civil war is the existence of
a third party - closer to one of the domestic groups - which we identify as
a foreign government who can affect the probability of winning the conflict
via, for example, monetary transfers or fighting operations in favor of one of
the domestic parties. We first argue that potential foreign interventions are
likely to induce information asymmetries which trigger war with a positive
probability. More importantly, these information asymmetries are persistent
over time and hence might be part of an explanation for long-lasting civil
wars. We then illustrate how a foreign intervention might destroy a possible
peace agreement even under symmetric information if the foreign country is
interested in investing in the country but is only willing to invest if his ally
is sufficiently strong. The domestic party that makes the coalition with the
foreign government will not want peace, if the spoils destroyed by the on-
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going war are less than the new expected economic opportunities created by
the alliance. War results if the post-conflict value of society increases after
a successful foreign intervention. This assumption captures situations where
the victory of a foreign sponsored party is followed by foreign investment,
aid, access to international financial institutions, opening of the economy, in-
ternational trade or any other measure seen as enhancing economic growth.
But even without this assumption war might result due to a foreign induced
commitment problem which allows the foreign country to confiscate some
of the domestic spoils by interchanging them for a higher win probability
thereby inducing a shift in power which is reverted if the alliance does not
take place. Even if commitment were possible, the alliance with the foreign
government does not really have to increase the post-conflict spoils of the
country: it is sufficient if it increases the personal spoils of the decision mak-
ers among its allies thereby inducing a political or personal bias a la Jackson
and Morelli (2007) causing (the prolongation of) war.
The model contains an explicit analysis of the cost and benefits for the
foreign government to be involved in civil wars abroad. The economic benefit
is represented by a share of post-conflict resources, provided the supported
faction wins and opens the economy. This involves, for example, corporation
returns to investment or access to unexploited natural resources or increased
gains from trade.3 The economic cost is basically that of supporting a fight-
ing group, for instance, the costs of sending war assistance, guns or even
soldiers. We also model the political incentives to intervene. The political
costs and benefits for the government of the foreign (intervening) country
have two components. First, there is an ideological cost which captures how
war prone the government is. Second, there are political costs and bene-
3Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (Forthcoming) show how CIA regime change operations
raise profits of U.S. multinational corporations. Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and Satyanath
(2010) show that after successful CIA interventions the US used its influence to create
a larger foreign market for American products. These increased imports of US products
mainly arose through direct government purchases.
4
fits. Funding civil wars are operations that do not receive full support from
society. In fact, these operations are generally secret and organized by in-
telligence agencies like the CIA in the U.S. They involve diverting resources
from other public goods like education or health. And also, these operations
imply that the intervening country contributes with spread of civilian casu-
alties and suffering. Thus, it is costly for the government to be perceived
as spreading civil wars. However, successful interventions are accompanied
with political benefits: supporting winning factions in conflict expands the
influence of the country in foreign affairs and permits the head of the gov-
ernment to be seen as a global leader, which in turns spurs support among
the population. The present analysis shows that civil wars may exist as a
consequence of changes in the domestic political affairs in the potential inter-
vening country by changing the political incentives to intervene. First, the
existence of a foreign influenced civil war depends on the ideological cost of
the government in office in the intervening nation. If this cost varies across
political parties then the incidence of civil war has to be influenced by what
political party holds the foreign government. Second, as the incentives to
intervene abroad depend on the need for the intervening government to gain
political support then civil war incidence should depend on the level of ap-
proval received by the intervening government. Hence, our model predicts
that ideology and approval of the government of the potential intervening
country matters for the likelihood of civil war.
Importantly, the political situation in the intervening country is an ex-
ogenous source of variation for the potential civil war in a country abroad.
Thus, estimating the influence of the political party in office and the govern-
ment approval in the potentially intervening country provides a strategy for
identification of the effect of foreign influence on civil war. Such an identifica-
tion strategy is useful due to the fact that foreign interventions are typically
secretive and might not be directly observable in the data.4 It is therefore
4For example, CIA operations are typically classified as top secret and declassification
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likely that the data on “internationalized” civil wars5 (defined as civil wars
where either the government and the opposition receives support from the
government of other states) understates foreign influence because it probably
misses covert support at least partially.
While our theoretical model applies to any country, our identification
strategy is only useful if it provides us with sufficient observations. We
therefore need to identify a country that has sufficient resources and might
have sufficient interests to intervene widely. As we concentrate on civil wars
during the second half of the 20th century, a natural candidate for a potential
intervening country is the U.S. First, its superpower status and the size of
its economy provides it with sufficient resources to intervene. Second, the
data on observed foreign interventions tells us that the U.S. has extensively
intervened in civil wars.6 Third, the U.S. is characterized by a two-party
system and, importantly, the two parties, Republican and Democratic, have
different views on the role of the U.S. in the international arenas. These
differences are epitomized by diverse Republican approaches to foreign policy
like the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe’s doctrine, and principles present
in the Eisenhower or Bush doctrines.7 This framework for foreign policy is
- if it occurs at all - only happens a long time after these operations took place. Moreover,
it is likely that the declassification is incomplete.
5as provided for example by the Uppsala/Prio data and the Correlates of War projects
(see Gleditsch (2007)).
6We mentioned examples in footnote 2.
7These doctrines basically justify interventions abroad by emphasizing the defense of
American values and the moral mandate of preserving (and installing) freedom around the
world. The doctrine elaborated by Monroe, and amended under Roosevelt’s presidency,
was more oriented to preserve American interests in the western hemisphere (Sexton,
Forthcoming); While both the democrat Truman and the republican Eisenhower justified
the right to intervene abroad as a measure to halt communism, Eisenhower was more
precise on the goals of U.S. foreign policy. In Truman’s words “..it must be the policy of
the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or outside pressures.” Truman (1947). In contrast, Eisenhower said that the
United States would give economic and military aid to Middle Eastern Nation as it was
essential to preserve this region from communism. As he put it U.S. intervention would
“include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to protect and secure
the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid,
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rooted in the Republican ideology which differs from the general approach
of the Democratic Party. As a consequence, the two parties systematically
differ in their propensities to intervene in foreign affairs. For example, most
(known) CIA regime change operations (sponsoring of a military coup) took
place under Republican presidency (Kinzer, 2006).8 Fourth, there is accurate
data on presidential approval for the case of the U.S. Last but not least, given
the secretive nature of interventions in civil wars abroad and the salience of
domestic issues during election campaigns, U.S. citizens are unlikely to decide
their vote based on domestic conflicts in other countries.
Following recent empirical studies, we exploit panel data to identify a
causal link between the politics in the U.S. and the incidence of civil war
relying on within-country variation. We adopt the empirical strategy devel-
oped in Besley and Persson (2009) and estimate the effect of a Republican
government in office and the level of presidential approval. The results are
striking and support our predictions. The incidence of civil war increases un-
der Republican governments and decreases with U.S. presidential approval.
Overall our results suggest that US foreign influence is a sizable driver of
conflict around the world. The Republican and approval effects withstand
several robustness checks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
discuss the related literature. The variations of the canonical bargaining
models are proposed and studied in section 3. Section 4 contains the explicit
cost and benefit analysis of the foreign government to intervene abroad and
derives our main predictions for endogenous foreign interventions. Section 5
reports the empirical exercises conducted to test the predictions of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.”
Eisenhower (1957).
8In many of these cases, these regimes changes involved civil conflicts like in Iran (1953),
Guatemala (1954), Nicaragua (1936).
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2 Related Literature
Notwithstanding the economics focus on almost exclusively domestic deter-
minants, the political science literature on foreign interventions and transna-
tional aspects of civil wars has been growing considerably in recent years.
The earlier literature used the term foreign interventions mainly as referring
to peace interventions in ongoing wars (Regan, 2000; Walter, 1997; Gartzke
and Gleditsch, 2006). This clearly is complementary to our approach where
the foreign interventions trigger or prolong an already existing war. This pos-
sibility was already mentioned by Gleditsch (2007), who argues that motives
for interventions in ongoing wars should be related to interventions caus-
ing war onset. He provides empirical evidence of the importance of ethnic,
political and economic transnational linkages among neighboring countries:
the probability of conflict in a given state is increasing in transnational eth-
nic links with the neighboring states, decreasing in the democratic degree
of political institutions of neighboring countries and decreasing in trade in-
tegration with surrounding states. Gleditsch (2007) hypothesizes that the
link is via external support of insurgencies whereas we propose models that
can also explain support to the incumbent government. Moreover, we move
away from neighboring countries in the strict spatial sense and consider the
possibility of politically / economically motivated foreign interventions in
general both theoretically and empirically. This is complementary to em-
pirical studies when civil wars spread which point to conflict in neighboring
states, (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and the presence of refugees (Salehyan
and Gleditsch, 2006) as a potential cause for civil war.
Foreign interventions in civil wars somehow blur the boundary between
civil and intra-state wars. The question when a state prefers to support
insurgencies instead of going to war and which type of rebel organizations
receive and accept foreign support has been analyzed by Salehyan (2010) and
by Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2010). This literature takes for
granted that the foreign state wants some type of war but does not explain
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why. Our paper abstracts from the trade-off foreign intervention versus direct
war only allowing for the former but we derive conditions for the endogenous
occurrence of foreign interventions.
In order to do so, we explicitly take the motives of politicians into account.
We do not only look at purely economical motives but also at political and
personal costs and benefits. One of the personal motives we put forward is
related to the “diversionary theory of war” literature. A “diversionary war”
is a war instigated by a country’s leader in order to distract its population
from their own domestic strife. This option is especially attractive to leaders
facing a near inevitable removal from office since exercising the war option
might enable them to signal a high military or foreign policy ability.9 This
incentive to gamble for resurrection is also present in our model, however,
the risk of the gamble is considerably reduced due to the secretive nature of
a foreign intervention. Since the public is unlikely to observe a failed foreign
intervention but can be made aware of (or perceive the effects of) successful
ones, one might expect that domestic problems have a stronger effect on
interventions in civil wars than on open aggressions towards other countries.
Indeed, we provide very robust empirical evidence of a positive link between
low presidential approval rates in the U.S. and incidences of civil wars around
the world while the enormous body of empirical studies on the diversionary
theory of war provides rather mixed evidence.10
Another personal motive we put forward is the personal cost of going
to war which we identify with being Republican or Democrat when taking
the model to the data. Our paper thereby adds to the open controversy
on whether the U.S. foreign policy is based on a bipartisan foreign policy
consensus or is partisan (that is, conditional on whether the government is
9For theoretical models on the diversionary theory of war see e.g. Hess and Orphanides
(1995); Smith (1996); Tarar (2006).
10For example, Ostrom and Job (1986); Morgan and Bickers (1992); Hess and Or-
phanides (1995); Miller (1995, 1999) find evidence for the diversionary theory while
Meernik and Waterman (1996); Gowa (1998); Mitchell and Moore (2002) find evidence
against it. Many of these papers look also at empirical evidence of acts short of war.
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Republican or Democrat)11 by providing support for the latter.
We heavily draw on the existing literature of the canonical bargaining
model of war (as e.g. in Dal Bo and Powell (2009)) and its variations to
explain why a foreign intervention can trigger or prolong an already ex-
isting civil war into which we introduce a third party. We show that the
possibility of a third-party intervention is sufficient to induce longer civil
wars by affecting the expected conflict spoils. Also, we use different existing
models showing that foreign involvement can cause asymmetric information
(Fearon, 1995; Esteban and Ray, 2008), new commitment problems (Fearon,
1995; Powell, 2004, 2006), and induce a political bias (Jackson and Morelli,
2007).12 The foreign induced commitment problem we identify is another
version of Powell’s argument that rapid shifts in the distribution of power lie
at the heart of war resulting from commitment problems. Salehyan (2007)
provides an additional argument: external sanctuaries in neighboring coun-
tries can complicate the underlying bargain between states and rebels.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on foreign influence on
domestic policy choices (Antra`s and Padro´ i Miquel (2008); Aidt and Hwang
(2008)) and the influence of foreign countries on the dynamics of domestic
political institutions. Aidt and Albornoz (Forthcoming) argue that foreign
countries may have an economic interest in sponsoring coups, stabilizing
dictatorships and facilitating constrained democratization abroad in order
to protect their foreign direct investment. Easterly, Satyanath, and Berger
(2008) estimate that (declassified) US and Soviet interventions abroad have
caused a decline in democracy across the world of about 33 percent. In Bon-
fatti (2010) a key trading partner may be interested to keep an incumbent in
power because the incumbent can be controlled more easily from the exterior
11See, for example, Rourke (1984); Wittkopf and McCormick (1998); McCormick and
Wittkopf (1990); Meernik (1993); Souva and Rohde (2007); Gowa (1998).
12Another determinant of civil war is the emergence of strategic risk due the uncertainty
associated with the payoffs of conflict Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (Forthcoming). We do
not elaborate on this, although it is easy to show that the possibility of foreign intervention
may cause strategic risk.
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than the challenger using the threat of trade sanction. Aidt, Albornoz, and
Gassebner (2010) show the influence of IMF and World Bank programmes
on political regime transitions.
As explained by Blattman and Miguel (2009), most of the empirical civil
war literature uses cross-sectional data and fails to exploit within-country
variation in panel data which leads to biased estimates by replacing time-
varying explanatory variables by their cross-sectional mean. Consequently,
cross-country variation in these explanatory observable variables are con-
founded with cross-country averages in unobserved parameters. To avoid this
problem, our empirical strategy only exploit within-country variations. This
way, we follow a new series of papers using panel data, mainly concerned by
the effect of different economic shocks on civil conflicts. This literature pro-
poses different instruments to capture income growth or wage shocks in order
to address potential endogeneity problems. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti
(2004) use rainfall variation to show a negative relationship between income
and civil war in Africa.13 Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) and Dube and Var-
gas (2008) study the effect of changes in commodity prices in Sub-Saharan
countries and Colombia, respectively. Besley and Persson (2009) use both
instruments in a more general study on the determinants of political violence,
which includes civil war and state repression. They also show how the effect
of income shocks depend on political institutions. Our paper builds on this
last paper, albeit our focus on civil war, and includes the novel dimension of
foreign intervention.
3 Theoretical Background
In this section we will use several models to illustrate how foreign influence
might affect civil war incidence. Our starting point is the simplest canonical
13In a recent paper, Ciccone (2010) contends that this result is incorrect and finds that
rainfall increases the incidence and onset of civil war.
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bargaining model of war where ”conflict situations are essentially bargaining
situations” (Schelling, 1960) and war - modeled as a costly lottery - is the
outside option in the bargaining game. In this model an incumbent gov-
ernment has to decide how to divide the spoils Π - the country’s pie - with
the opposition. The incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to appease
the opposition who might already be fighting or considering to start a civil
war. If the opposition accepts, the opposition receives the proposed share of
the spoils yΠ and peace prevails / returns to the country. If the opposition
rejects, there will be civil war. This might be a new war or the continuation
of an existing war after a failed peace agreement. Fighting destroys part of
the initial pie and results in a lottery over the surviving spoils σΠ with win
probabilities (1− p) and p for government and opposition respectively. It is
easy to see that in this model with complete information a purely domestic
civil war is always deterred (or an ongoing civil war comes to an end once
there is complete information). The incumbent will prefer to buy off the
opposition if (1− y)Π ≥ (1− p)σΠ, hence is willing to offer y ≤ 1− (1− p)σ,
which will be accepted by the opposition as long as yΠ ≥ pσΠ. Since fighting
is costly, pσ ≤ y < 1− (1− p)σ and the opposition can always be bought off.
Offering the opposition exactly its certainty equivalent payoff pσΠ allows the
government to keep whatever is saved by the war.
We now introduce a third party, a foreign country with economic interests
in the domestic country. These economic interests can take many different
forms e.g. foreign direct investment, trading opportunities, interest in natural
resources, or interests grounded in geopolitical motives. We now propose a
series of models - some of which are reinterpretation of existing models - in
which this third country has an interest in striking either a deal with the
government or with the opposition and thereby destroys a possible peace
agreement either causing or prolonging a civil war. These models are not
meant as competing theories but might apply simultaneously and describe
different political and economical situations.
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3.1 Foreign-caused information asymmetries
Information asymmetries are a central theme in the literature on rationalist
explanations of war (see e.g. Jackson and Morelli (Forthcoming)). Informa-
tion asymmetries are accepted as causes of war, but it is generally argued
that asymmetric information cannot fully explain long lasting conflicts be-
cause both sides will learn the true information over time (Fearon (2004)). In
what follows we will argue that the existence of a potential intervening coun-
try destroys this insight: the possibility of foreign interventions is likely to
lead to asymmetric information which might not only cause but also explain
long lasting civil wars.
Information asymmetries may come in several forms: there might be pri-
vate information about the spoils of the country (Dal Bo and Powell (2009)),
about fighting resources involved14 or the cost of fighting and hence the will-
ingness to fight. The better informed side has incentives to misrepresent its
information due to a trade-off between avoiding costly war and doing well
in the bargaining situation. Under complete information the opposition is
bought off by pσΠ, which indicates that successfully exaggerating the win
probability would lead to a better deal. Similarly, asymmetric information
concerning the spoils of the country comes with incentives to understate the
size of the spoils. To discipline the informed party to reveal the truth, the
uninformed party will fight with a positive probability.
A foreign country with economic interests in the domestic country is likely
to cause information asymmetries that might lead to (or cause the continua-
tion of) war. If the foreign country is able to strike a deal with the incumbent
government this will affect the spoils of the country. Since the government
learns about the investment plans, technology and other factors of the for-
eign country, it is likely to be better informed about the resulting spoils
than the opposition which as Dal Bo and Powell (2009) have shown leads to
14See e.g. Esteban and Ray (2008) for a model where asymmetric information about
the fighting resources involved may initiate a conflict.
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war with a positive probability. Moreover, the alliance with a foreign coun-
try causes asymmetric information about the win probabilities and fighting
resources involved between the domestic party. The party with whom the
foreign country is allied will have better information about the amount of
resources the foreign country is willing to provide in case of a conflict. More-
over, and more importantly, the exact amount of foreign resources depends
on political factors in the foreign country that are highly uncertain and bet-
ter understood within an alliance since they are not directly observable from
the domestic country.15 These fluctuations are exogenous to the domestic
parties in conflict and might lead to long lasting information asymmetries,
which change over time and cannot (rapidly and evenly) be learned. This
way, foreign interventions generate persistent uncertainty over the fighting
resources available for each party in conflict which might explain even long-
lasting conflicts.
3.2 Foreign caused (prolongations) of war under sym-
metric information
In the previous section we argued that the possibility of a foreign alliance can
generate persistent asymmetric information and thereby explain long-lasting
conflicts. Now we will show that a foreign alliance might prolong a civil war
that would have ended otherwise even if there is full information. Imagine a
domestic civil war that had been caused by some information asymmetries
but both sides have learned the true information over time. Hence, we are
back to our canonical bargaining model and both sides would be willing to
sign a peace agreement. However, there is a third country with economic
interests in the domestic country who is willing to team up with one of the
15This will be shown in Section 4 where we identify two important potential variations.
The head of government in the foreign country might change and hence also the personal
costs of going to war. Approval rates vary over time and change the incentives to intervene
abroad.
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sides in exchange for certain economic favors like, for example, opening the
economy for foreign investment. These economic favors are growth enhanc-
ing. The foreign country wants to ensure the returns to its investment and
is therefore only willing to add to the growth of the domestic country if the
party in power - his ally - is sufficiently strong. In other words, it is reason-
able to assume that the foreign country only increases the home country’s
pie after the faction it supported won the war. The following analysis shows
that such an alliance might prolong the civil war. This will be the case for an
alliance with the incumbent government but also with the opposition. Whom
the alliance is offered to will depend on ideological and geopolitical reasons.
Such an alliance is attractive for the foreign government whenever one of the
domestic groups has a somehow hostile attitude towards the foreign country.
Consider first the case when the foreign country offers an alliance to the
incumbent government. Suppose that the present value of the spoils is Π
as before and the domestic government has to decide whether to appease
the opposition by offering a share y of these spoils. Alternatively, it could
make an alliance with the foreign country exchanging certain economic favors
against support in the civil war and total (expected) benefits x of the new
economic opportunities arising from the investment of the foreign country.
Let (1− px) ≥ (1− p) be the win probability of the incumbent government
resulting from a successful alliance with a foreign country. Then
Proposition 1 The incumbent government will prefer the alliance with the
foreign country to appeasing the opposition if (1−σ)
1−px Π < x
Proof. The incumbent government is willing to appease the opposition if
(1− y)Π ≥ (1− px)(σΠ + x)
or equivalently if
y ≤ 1− σ + pxσ − (1− px) x
Π
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On the other hand the opposition is willing to accept if
yΠ > pxσΠ
The bargaining range is empty if
1− σ − (1− px) x
Π
< 0
The intuition is as follows. The government continues the war if what
is destroyed by the war, namely (1− σ) Π, is less than the expected new
economic opportunities for the government created by the war , namely (1−
px)x.
Now let’s look at the case where the foreign country offers an alliance to
the opposition. This alliance increases the win probability of the opposition
to pF > p and grants the opposition a total (expected benefit) z of the new
economic opportunities arising from the investment in the foreign country.
Then
Proposition 2 The opposition will prefer the alliance with the foreign coun-
try to being appeased by the domestic government if z > (1−σ)
pf
Π
Proof. The incumbent government is willing to appease the opposition if
(1− y)Π ≥ (1− pf )σΠ
or equivalently if
y ≤ 1− (1− pf )σ
On the other hand the opposition is willing to accept if
y > pf
(σΠ + z)
Π
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The bargaining range is empty if
1− (1− pf )σ − pf (σΠ + z)
Π
< 0
Hence, the opposition prefers to continue the war, if the expected new
economic opportunities created for the opposition pfz outweigh the cost of
war, namely (1− σ) Π.
A commitment problem prevents the possibility of the alliance to buy off
the opposing domestic party. We assumed that the opposing domestic party
has a somehow unfriendly attitude towards the foreign state. This could be
due to ideological reasons or the attempt to preserve the status of being the
main political and economic elite.16 Hence, keeping the foreign state out of
the country implies some indivisible rents. Still, indivisibilities alone don’t
explain the occurrence of war because of the destruction it implies. Indeed,
the following lottery which is based on a mechanism proposed by Powell
(2006) would seem to dominate the war: the winner of the lottery keeps
the spoils and decides whether or not to permit the opening of the economy
to the foreign country. The win probabilities of the lottery correspond to
the respective probabilities of winning the war. However, the loser of the
gamble always has an incentive to renege because the returns from starting
a civil war are higher than the returns from the ex post allocation. The real
impediment to agreement is not the indivisibility itself but the commitment
problem that the indivisibility entails.17
The above result shows that if the alliance with a foreign government
16The unfriendly attitude and bargaining indivisibilities might also be due to an alliance
with another foreign country.
17One might wonder why there is no credibility issue concerning the foreign government.
Notice that the party allied with the foreign government will be in charge after winning
the conflict, hence the real issue is why this party is credible. It has an incentive to stick
to the deal because otherwise there will be no investments or aid which are necessary to
increase the pie. The foreign government will stick to the deal to avoid expropriation.
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increases the expected ex-post conflict spoils of a society the foreign third
party decreases the bargaining range for peace and thereby forces a situation
where peaceful agreements are more difficult to reach. Such a situation is
likely to arise if the foreign alliance occurs during an ongoing war but the
model where the alliance occurs with the opposition could also explain the
initiation of war whenever the foreign investment after the war is big enough.
If the foreign government can offer slightly more than zmin =
(1−σ)
pf
Π to the
opposition, the domestic government can no longer match the offer and war
prevails. We will show next, that even if the government could match the
offer of the foreign state, war might not be prevented (terminated) due to a
foreign caused commitment problem.
3.3 Foreign-caused commitment problems
Suppose the foreign government offers the opposition less than zmin so that
the domestic government can match the offer. Will the opposition accept this
deal with the domestic government? This crucially depends on the nature of
the potential alliance with the foreign government. If the foreign government
is invariant in its interest in forming an alliance with the opposition, then
the domestic government will deter conflict as long as z < zmin and we are
back to proposition 2. However, it is unlikely that the foreign government
is invariant in its interest in forming an alliance with the opposition. First,
the presence of a potentially intervening foreign country is exogenous to the
domestic economy. Furthermore, the interests associated with interventions
abroad change over time and are determined by factors that are not related
to the country in conflict.18 Moreover, the benefits of intervention are contin-
gent to what the opposition will do once in office and clearly being rejected
by the opposition deteriorates the foreign interest in intervention in that
country because it reduces the possibility of future agreements. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that there are situations in which the possibility
18This will be shown in section 4.
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of an alliance is restricted to the moment it takes place. Thus, rejecting an
alliance with a foreign government makes any future alliance with the oppo-
sition unlikely. In this case, if the opposition accepts the appeasement offer
from the domestic government, the opposition constitutes less of a threat to
the domestic government since its probability of winning the conflict drops
from pF to p. As a consequence, the domestic government will renege on any
earlier agreement higher than pσΠ. This establishes the following result:
Proposition 3 Due to commitment problems, any offer by the foreign gov-
ernment that gives the opposition more than pσΠ will trigger a civil war.
Two different forces are at play here. On the one hand, a successful
foreign intervention increases the pie, which reduces the ex ante bargain-
ing range for peace. On the other hand, the foreign intervention induces a
power shift in the domestic country by increasing the win probability of the
opposition. This allows us to link our occurrence of war to Powell (2004,
2006)’s argument that inefficient conflict is due to a commitment problem,
which results from large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power. Accepting
the government’s appeasement attempt requires foregoing this power shift by
giving up the possible alliance with the foreign country. Hence, the govern-
ment cannot credibly offer the opposition a peaceful allocation of pre-civil
war resources because the government would have incentives to renege on
any early agreement once the alliance did not take place. This is a new type
of commitment problem our analysis uncovers.
Proposition 3 implies as a corollary that civil war will result even if the
foreign intervention does not increase the post-conflict spoils of the country.
To illustrate this observe that any offer (z, pf ) by the foreign government such
that pσΠ < pf (σΠ+z) triggers war. This is equivalent to z > z˜ = σΠ(
p
pf
−1).
But z˜ < 0 since p < pf . In other words, due to the induced power shift the
foreign government can even confiscate some of the surviving spoils!
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3.4 Personal gains and political bias
In this section we offer an alternative interpretation of the model which
does not required an increase in the post-conflict spoils even if there was
no commitment problem. We will discuss the alliance with the opposition.
As before the foreign government offers support in the civil war in exchange
for some economic favors. To make the offer more attractive, the foreign
government provides extra benefits z to the opposition leaders only. Hence,
the foreign party induces a political bias of their pivotal decision maker a la
(Jackson and Morelli, 2007). The war is now worth more to the opposition
leaders than to the opposition as a whole since it grants the leader additional
benefits: the personal bribes from the foreign country allow the leader to keep
a disproportional share of the gains from war and the backing of the foreign
country leads to other personal gains like personal recognition and power.
Proposition 2 now provides the minimum size of personal gains that make a
peaceful settlement impossible / prolong a civil war abroad.
4 Endogenous foreign intervention
We now turn to the cost benefit analysis of the foreign intervention to in-
vestigate the condition under which the foreign government is willing to
create/prolong a civil war abroad. The head of government of a foreign
country is willing to take part in a civil war abroad if the total benefits
outweigh the costs. Both benefits and costs have an economic and per-
sonal/ideological component. The different (interpretations of the) models
suggested above lead to different economic costs and benefits, however the
personal/ideological component is identical to all those models. In general
we will denote the economic benefits by E(B) and the costs by by f(r) where
r are the resources dedicated to the intervention. Let f(0) = 0 and f ′(r) > 0,
f
′′
(r) ≤ 0. We will use the alliance with the opposition to illustrate the effect
of the amount of resources on the win probability. We assume that p′f (r) > 0
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and that pf (r) ≤ 1 for ∀r. Also pf (r = 0) = p.
We now turn to the personal costs and benefits of causing a civil war
abroad. These have two components:
• An ideological component capturing the strictly personal cost ci of pro-
voking a civil war.
• The level of approval enjoyed by the government.
We assume that the head of government cares about his approval because
he derives personal rents from being popular: these rents can be interpreted
as future rents due to re-election possibility or simply as ego-rents. We will
denote the rents resulting from the head of government’s popularity before
deciding whether or not to finance an intervention in another country by u.
A successful ending of the war will spurt the head of government’s popularity
because of the possibility of signaling (e.g. by a state visit) global leadership
and the new economic benefits associated with friendlier governments around
the world.
To keep the model simple we assume that after a successful civil war the
popularity jumps up to u > u. An unsuccessful foreign intervention will
only affect the head of government’s approval if discovered by the public
resulting in a drop in approval to a minimum level u < u. We assume a fixed
probability δ that the public discovers the covert support for an unsuccessful
civil war. With these assumptions sponsoring a civil war can improve the
head of government’s ego-rents if
pfu+ (1− pf )δu+ (1− pf )(1− δ)u > u
or equivalently
pf (u− u)− δ(1− pf )(u− u) > 0 (1)
where we illustrate the ego rents for an alliance with the opposition.
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Proposition 4 For pf >
δ
1+δ
condition (1) is easier to satisfy the lower is
u.
Proof. The left hand side of (1) is decreasing in u if pf >
δ
1+δ
Hence, if the probability to be discovered is sufficiently small relative to
the probability of success in the civil war, initiating a civil war abroad serves
unpopular politicians as a way to gamble for resurrection at home. The lower
their initial popularity, the less there is to lose in case of a failed intervention
and the more there is to gain in case of a successful intervention.
Joining economic and personal incentives the head of government in the
foreign country will be willing to go to war allied with the opposition if and
only if
E(B) + pf (u− u)− δ(1− pf )(u− u) > ci + f(r) (2)
For illustrative purposes we will use the model without commitment prob-
lems where the foreign government has to offer zmin =
(1−σ)
pf
Π to the oppo-
sition. Let ΠF be the total economic gains from a successful intervention.
Then the foreign government is willing to intervene if
pf
(
ΠF − (1− σ)
pf
Π
)
+ pf (u− u)− δ(1− pf )(u− u) > ci + f(r)
Any interior r has to satisfy the following first order condition:
p′f (ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u)) = f ′(r) (3)
The politician will choose this interior r if and only if it satisfies (2). Other-
wise he will refrain from the intervention.
For illustrative purposes we use the following particular functional forms
for pf and f(r) in the remainder of the section. Let
pf =
ro + r
rI + ro + r
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where rI and ro are the resources devoted to fighting by the incumbent and
the opposition respectively and
f(r) = r
Under these assumptions (3) becomes
rI
(ro + rI + r)2
(ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u)) = 1
So the optimal resources r dedicated by the foreign government towards the
civil war are
r =
√
rI (ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u))− ro − rI
and
pf = 1−
√
rI√
(ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u))
Substituting the resulting expressions for f(r) and pf into equation 2 and
simplifying yield
Ψ =
(√
(ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u))−√rI
)2
+ ro −Π(1− σ)− δ(u− u) > ci
(4)
After inspection of Ψ, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 The foreign politicians willingness to sponsor a civil war
abroad is increasing in ΠF , ro and σ and decreasing in δ, rI , ci,Π and u.
Proof. The comparative static results for ΠF ,Π, σ, ro, rI and ci are imme-
diate from condition (4). Simple calculations show that the left hand side of
(4) decreases in δ. The change with respect to u is given as
∂Ψ
∂u
= (−1 + δ)
√
(ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u))−√rI√
(ΠF + (u− u) + δ(u− u))
− δ < 0
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Hence, the war is more attractive, the bigger the economic gains after
a successful intervention, the higher the war resources of the ally, the less
destructive the war, the lower the domestic country’s spoils, the lower the war
resources of the non-ally and the lower the probability that the intervention
is discovered, the lower the personal cost of going to war and the lower the
foreign politician’s popularity.
This result implies two testable predictions of our model:
Prediction 1 Ideology matters: the probability of civil war should increase
if the head of the foreign government has a more pro-war ideology and hence
lower personal costs ci to initiate a civil war.
Prediction 2 Approval matters: The probability of civil war decreases with
the approval of the foreign government within its own country.
Prediction 2 might be surprising. Since involvement in civil wars is se-
cretive, how can this depend on presidential approval rates? It is exactly
this secretive nature of foreign interventions that make them a safe bet. An
unsuccessful involvement in a civil war is likely to go unnoticed by the pub-
lic, while the president always has ways and means to get credit for new
economic opportunities after a successful intervention even if the public does
not know whether or not their country was involved. The downside is low
risk and is smaller for governments with low approval than for popular gov-
ernments while the upside is bigger. The secretive nature of the intervention
encourages the gamble.
Alternatively, we can interpret ci and u as determined by lobbying from
corporations. ci may capture differences in how sensitive political parties are
to lobbying or care about corporation business opportunities. A more pro-
corporation party should be associated with a lower (or even a negative) ci.
Indeed, there is evidence that this is the case for the U.S. where the Repub-
lican Party seems to be more influenceable by lobbies than the Democratic
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Party (see, for example, Jayachandran (2006)). Similarly, if the probability
of re-election is associated with campaign contributions, then a government
with low approval will increase its re-election probabilities by relying more
on the support from corporations. This in turns makes the government more
likely to intervene abroad to improve corporations business opportunities.
For example, Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2008) show that CIA operations to
depose leaders abroad increase stock market values of corporations benefiting
from the perspective of a new friendlier government in the foreign country.
These predictions are important since they relate politics in the poten-
tially intervening foreign country to the probability of civil war around the
world. Obviously, this depends on the actual foreign country we consider.
We turn to this in the implementation of the empirical analysis.
5 Empirical Exercises
Our analysis shows that ideology and popularity both affect the incentives
to intervene in conflicts abroad. If foreign intervention determines civil war,
these time-varying characteristics of the political situation in a potentially in-
tervening country should affect the probability of observing civil war around
the world. Political changes in an intervening country constitute exogenous
variations from the perspective of the country potentially in conflict. There-
fore, our predictions provide a way to identify the effect of foreign interven-
tion on the incidence of civil war. Of course, as our analysis shows, not every
country will intervene in other countries’ conflicts. Implementation of our
strategy requires identifying a potentially intervening country.
We focus on the case of the U.S. as a source of foreign intervention. The
reasons are obvious. The U.S. is a global leader with massive economic and
political interests all over the world. As discussed in the introduction, there
are numerous episodes of civil war where one of the sides was supported by
the U.S. Importantly for our purpose, the Democrat and Republic govern-
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ment may differ in their foreign policy and willingness to intervene in foreign
affairs. As argued above, Republican foreign policy is more interventionist
and more explicit about the benefits and obligations of spreading U.S. values
and influence over the world. Last, as civil war foreign operations are mainly
secret, U.S. citizens vote without these interventions in mind.19
As a proxy for personal costs and benefits from supporting a civil war
abroad we use the president’s party affiliation and his approval rates (PAt).
To illustrate the plausibility of a Republican effect on civil war, we de-
fine a dichotomic variable indicating whether the U.S. incumbent party is
Republican or not. That is,
REPt =
{
1, if U.S. government is Republican in year t
0, Otherwise
In order to provide some preliminary evidence of the Republican and
Presidential approval effects, table 1 reports the average number of ongoing
and outbreaking civil wars (based on the Uppsala/PRIO data set) under
Democratic and Republican administrations for the period 1950-2006. We
also differentiate between years where the incumbent enjoyed from low (be-
19The voting behavior of Americans has been intensively studied (see Bartels (Forth-
coming) for an overview). While early studies claimed that votes were only determined
by domestic issues - stressing the importance of economic factors (see e.g. Lewis-Beck,
Nadeau, and Elias (2008) and references therein), - a more recent literature also emphasizes
the importance of international issues (see Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989)). Kessel
(2004) analyzes the presidential elections from 1952 to 2000 using the American National
Election Studies whose open-ended questions provide a measure of valence towards candi-
date, party and issue objects in the elections. He shows that in all 13 elections economic
and general issues were extremely important, but international issues also mattered in 11
of these 13 elections.
While there is evidence that consistent with the spirit of our model presidential approval
is linked to foreign issues (e.g. Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, and Sharp (2006); Hurwitz
and Peﬄey (1987)), foreign policy issues only influence votes in so far as the public has
coherent attitudes about foreign policy and the political parties uphold distinct foreign
policy platforms and the foreign policy issue is made salient e.g. by the media (Aldrich,
Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, and Sharp, 2006). There is no indication that a civil war in another
country becomes such a salient issue to affect the election of presidential candidates in the
US.
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low the median) or high (above the median) presidential approval rates. The
incidence of civil war is 50% higher under Republican administrations. It
is also 34% higher when only the number of outbreaking conflicts are con-
sidered. In the second panel, we observe that ongoing and outbreaking civil
wars are around twice as numerous in years in which the U.S incumbent
suffers from approval rates that are below the median over the whole period
(1950-2000).
Table 1: Number of Civil Wars, 1950-2000
Democratic Republican
Administration Administration
Ongoing conflicts 6.88 9.88
(8.26) (10.04)
Outbreaking conflicts 1.23 1.56
(1.36) (1.35)
High Low
Presidential Approval Presidential Approval
Ongoing conflicts 6.08 11.84
(6.77) (6.02)
Outbreaking conflicts 0.94 2.03
(1.28) (1.21)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Naturally these figures, while consistent with U.S. influenced civil wars,
may reflect other factors playing a role. Therefore, we now investigate our
predictions in more detail.
5.1 The main estimation
We estimate the incidence of civil war; that is, the probability of observing
civil war in country j in year t (conflict jt).
To put our results in context, we replicate the empirical strategy de-
veloped in Besley and Persson (2009). Consequently, we use a variable of
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natural disasters (Natural Disaster j,t) as an instrument for wage or income
shocks.20 As discussed in Section 2, most of the empirical civil war litera-
ture fails to exploit within-country variation in panel data, which leads to
biased estimates. To avoid this problem, we only exploit within country
variations. Thus, country fixed effects (γj) are used in all of our main es-
timations as in Besley and Persson (2009), Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) or
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004). To this specification, we include our
REPt and PAt variables.
The main difficulty with our empirical strategy is that both REP and PA
are year (country-invariant) variables, which makes it difficult to distinguish
the effects of Republican governments or presidential approval from any other
country invariant year effect, like, for example, aggregate shocks taking place
at the world level in a given year. In principle, this should not be a serious
source of concern as long as the processes followed by the political cycle or
the evolution of preferential approval in the U.S. are independent from the
process governing the evolution of the other relevant year fixed effects, like
global and U.S. productivity or demand shocks or oil prices. In any case,
to mitigate this unlikely but potential problem, we include the growth of
gross world (∆logGWPt) product to capture aggregate demand or produc-
tivity shocks. Furthermore, we also include in some specifications the U.S.
gross domestic product to control for economic shocks specific to the U.S.
(∆logGWPUS,t). Finally, we also control for changes in oil prices (∆logOil
Pricet). This way we control for the most plausible potential sources of civil
war that may be omitted behind our REPt or PAt variables.
To summarize, we test estimations of the following type:
conflictjt = α1Natural Disasterjt + α2REPt + α3PAt + x
′
tβ + γj + µjt,
where x′ is a vector of additional (country invariant) year variables like the
20These constitute exogenous variations in the evolution of the wage/income rate.
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mentioned ∆logGWPt, ∆logGWPUS,t or ∆logOil Pricet.
As we follow Besley and Persson (2009) we expect α1 to be significantly
positive. More importantly for our purposes, Predictions 1 and 2 imply a
positive α2 and a negative α3.
5.2 Data
We exploit panel data covering 181 countries and the years 1950 to 2006.
Our basic data set is taken from Besley and Persson (2009). It uses the
UCDP/PRIO civil-war incidence measure taking a value of 1 if a given coun-
try in a given year was involved in civil war - defined by a cumulated death
toll of more than 1000 people. Alternatively, we use a measure of civil war
based on the Correlates of War (COW) database, which runs up to 1997
only.21
The measure of natural disasters is constructed by Besley and Persson
(2009) from the EM-DAT data set and includes the number of extreme tem-
perature events, floods, slides and tidal-waves in a given country and year.
The presidential approval rates, our PA variable, are taken from Gallup.
We use the total percentage of positive presidential approval per year.
Oil prices are taken from BP world energy statistics. They provide oil
prices based on key crudes quotes from Brent, West Texas Intermediate
(WTI), Nigerian Focados and Dubai expressed in US $ per barrel. Last,
statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP are taken from
Angus Maddison’s dataset.22
21The correlation between both datasets is very high (about 75% at country-year level)
and their use make no difference in terms of our results, which are qualitatively the same
and quantitatively very similar under both measures of civil war.
22http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/
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5.3 Results on the Republican Effect
We report the results of our basic specification in Table 2. To allow for
country fixed effects, we estimate conditional logits. In column 1 we report
the most basic specification. Reassuringly, negative shocks in the wage rate
or income triggered by a natural disaster raise the probability of observing
civil war in a similar way and order of magnitude than Besley and Persson
(2009). Importantly, the coefficient associated with REPt is positive and
significant. The magnitude of the estimated effect is far from trivial: the
coefficient implies an odd ratio of 1.56, which indicates that the probability
of observing a civil war in a country is 56 % higher when the U.S. is under
a Republican presidency.
The effects of these two variables are robust to any modification we per-
form on the basic specification. In the remaining specifications we include
∆logGWPt. This way we control for aggregate productivity or demand
shocks, which may be correlated with the U.S. political party in office. The
associated coefficient is negative but insignificant. In the following estima-
tion (columns 3), we add ∆logGWPUS,t, which controls for GDP growth in
the U.S. Interestingly, this variable appears to have a negative effect on civil
war incidence, which suggests that U.S. sponsored civil war might be likelier
during recessions. Including these additional country invariant year variables
has no qualitatively effect on neither the way in which Natural Disaster (as
a proxy of wage rate or income shocks) or REPt affect the probability of a
civil war.
Finally, we control for changes in oil prices. The reason is that oil prices
may affect both the political situation in the U.S., through its effects on
U.S. inflation, and the incidence of conflict via inflation or, for oil producer
countries, its effects on national income or revenues. Although we find a
positive (not far from statistically significant) effect of variations in oil prices,
the inclusion of this additional year (country-invariant) variable does not
affect our main results.
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Table 2: The Republican Effect on Civil War
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.445*** 0.443*** 0.432*** 0.431***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
REPt 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.515*** 0.494***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.114) (0.115)
∆logGWPt -0.382 2.640** 2.486*
(0.344) (1.312) (1.301)
∆logGDPUS,t -2.337*
(1.363)
∆logOil Pricest 0.002
(0.001)
Sample All All All All
Observations 3,046 3,046 3,040 3,040
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.4 Results on Presidential Approval
We investigate now whether the level of approval for the U.S. president has
an impact on the probability of observing a civil war. We build on the
previous results to undertake our second test. As discussed above, we expect
U.S. presidents to be keener to intervene abroad under low level of approval.
Thus, if foreign intervention is a determinant of civil wars we should expect a
significantly negative coefficient associated with our U.S presidential approval
variable (PAt). And that is what we observe in all our specifications. The
coefficient of PAt is always negative and significant. The implied odd ratio is
around .95, This indicates that a decrease of PAt in 1 percentage point raises
the probability of civil war by 5%. Observe that the coefficient associated
with REPt is even bigger once PAt is controlled for. This further reinforces
the idea that the effect of Republican government is rather ideological (i.e.
intrinsic to Republican ethos). It is interesting to notice that the effect of
variations in oil prices becomes significant now. Again, this has no impact
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on our main results.
Table 3: Basic Specification with Preferential Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.340*** 0.336*** 0.324*** 0.316
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
REPt 0.769*** 0.780*** 0.795*** 0.745***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.126) (0.128)
PAt -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆logGWPt -0.519 1.835 1.755
(0.409) (1.642) (1.633)
∆logGDPUS,t -0.856
(1.741)
∆logOil Pricest 0.003**
(0.001)
Sample All All All All
Observations 2,177 2,177 2,171 2,171
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.5 Robustness
We perform a multiplicity of robustness checks. In table 4 we report a series of
variations on the samples we considered previously. In column 1, we restrict
the sample to non-OECD countries. If any, the effect is to increase the
coefficients associated with REPt and PAt. As a check, we focus on OECD
countries in column 2. Reassuringly, the key coefficients loose significance. In
columns 3 and 4, we concentrate on South-Saharan countries and Commodity
Exporters, respectively. Both of our key results hold.
In column 5, we explore further the possibility that REP is capturing
something else rather than variation in the propensity of the U.S. to intervene
abroad. We can argue that party ideology of a foreign government should be
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more important for the case of the U.S. than for other countries. That is, we
should not observe that the probability of civil war is determined by which
party is in office in countries like, for example, Sweden or even in the U.K.
Interestingly, politics in those countries are also characterized by alternating
political parties with different ideology so we can create variables like SOCSWt
or CONUKt . These new variables take the value of 1 if the government is
conservative in the U.K. and socialist in Sweden respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Once we include these variables, only the coefficient associated with REP is
significant (and still positive). This reinforces the view that civil wars are
influenced by the U.S., specially under Republican terms. Notice as well that
the inclusion of SOCSWt or CON
UK
t does not affect the effect of PAt.
In column 6, we display the results of a counterfactual. We restrict our
sample to former French colonies where we should not expect strong U.S
intervention. As these countries are under the influence of France not the
U.S., our results should not hold. As shown in column 5 neither REP nor
PA are associated with significant coefficients, strengthening our argument.
In the last two columns of table 4, we investigate whether our results
are driven by the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In
columns 7 and 8 we report our basic specification years under and after the
Cold War, respectively. Our results are similar under both periods, which
suggests that the Republican and the Presidential Approval effects go beyond
the cold war.23 If any, the coefficients are stronger after the Cold War.
This could be interpreted as further evidence of U.S intervention in conflicts
abroad motivated mainly on U.S. domestic political situation.
We explore different specifications in Table 5. In column 1, we include
a time trend, which turns out to be positive and significant. In column 2,
we report an estimation with decade fixed effects. Column 3 displays the
estimation where we replaced NaturalDisasterj,t by the ∆logGDPj,t as in,
23Notice that the literature does not find any direct effect of the Cold War on Civil War.
See for example, Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Sambanis (2005).
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for example, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004). In column 4, we add a new variable
that takes the value of 1 for democratic countries defined using the Polity
IV measures of democracy. This way we add more time variant domestic
determinants. This has no effect on the relevance of REP and PA on the
incidence of civil war. In column 5, we explore the possibility of our results
being influenced by the timing between the moment the decision is made and
the actual implementation of the intervention. We do so by lagging PA by
1 year and disaggregating REP in the first, second, third and fourth year
of a Republican term. All the coefficients associated with REPY 1t , REP
Y 2
t ,
REPY 3t , REP
Y 4
t and PAt−1 have the sign and significance we expected.
In column 6 we report our basic specification but using an alternative
variable of civil war instead, built on the Correlates of War (COW) database.
Clearly, our results on the effect of the ideology and the support of a U.S.
government are robust to any of these variations.24
In column 7 we discard a reverse causality problem: could it be the case
that American citizens feel in danger if there are too many civil wars around
the world and seek safety by voting for a Republican candidate? We address
this potential problem by controlling for the number of civil wars taking
place during presidential election years (NCWEY ). As reported in column 7,
the estimates of the Republican and Presidential Approval effects come out
virtually the same.
We estimate a linear probability model using OLS (reported in appendix)
instead of conditional logit. As shown in table 7, the results are similar and
if anything of a smaller magnitude. For example, the coefficient associated
with REP indicates that the unconditional probability of observing a civil
war, which is around 15 %, raises about 20 % when Republicans are in office.
As a last concern, the error terms might be correlated across time for
observations corresponding to the same presidential mandate. To correct
24In fact, we have run the same regressions reported in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 but on a
measure of civil war incidence based on COW and all the results hold.
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for this potential drawback, we allow for an arbitrary covariance structure
within presidential mandates by computing our bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the presidential mandate level. We rerun regressions for all the
specifications and the results come out identical for the effect of REP. On the
other hand, the estimates of the presidential approval, although relatively
less precise, they are still significant.25 This may reflect the fact that our
presidential approval variable might suffer from a certain degree of serial
correlation within each presidential term.
5.6 The Onset of Civil War
Our theoretical analysis shows that foreign intervention increases the occur-
rence of civil war through triggering new conflicts and prolonging existing
ones. For this reason, our main empirical investigation is on the incidence
of civil war, which captures both dimensions of a civil war. We check now
whether our insights persist once the onset of civil is considered instead. We
report in table 6 our basic specification. Although weaker, the effect of our
variables is robust to considering the onset of civil war, which we interpret
as evidence of the influence of U.S. politics on the emergence of civil conflicts
abroad.26
6 Concluding Remarks
Foreign interventions in civil wars are typically secretively in nature and
therefore difficult to observe directly. In this paper, we use several variations
of the canonical bargaining model of war to illustrate that civil wars might
be triggered or prolonged by secretive foreign interventions. The explicit
25To save space, we only report in table 8 (in the Appendix) our results with boot-
strapped standard errors for the specifications displayed in table 3.
26The fact that the results are relatively weaker was to be expected according to our
theory and the constraint imposed by fewer observations.
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Table 6: Basic Specification for the Onset of Civil War
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.527* 0.535* 0.536* 0.540*
(0.277) (0.277) (0.278) (0.279)
REPt 0.752** 0.739* 0.734* 0.700*
(0.394) (0.394) (0.399) (0.407)
PAt -0.0292** -0.0263* -0.0261* -0.0260*
(0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0145)
∆logGWPt 4.023 4.044 3.940
(3.027) (3.039) (3.051)
∆logGDPUS,t -0.205 -0.0155
(3.160) (3.128)
∆logOil Pricest 0.00160
(0.00399)
Sample All All All All
Observations 909 909 909 909
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
analysis of the incentives for a third party to intervene leads to two clear-cut
predictions that provide an identification strategy for the relevance of for-
eign intervention on the incidence and onset of civil war. Both predictions
are confirmed for the case of the U.S as a potential intervening country: (i)
civil wars are more likely to take place when the U.S. is under a Republican
government and (ii) the probability of civil wars decrease with U.S. presiden-
tial approval rates. These empirical results, relevant and novel in themselves,
show that foreign influence is an important determinant of civil war around
the world.
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Appendix
Table 7: Various Specifications, Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
REPt 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
PAt -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
∆logGWPt -0.077*** 0.056 -0.075*** 0.060
(0.024) (0.072) (0.026) (0.060)
∆logGDPUS,t -0.018
(0.069)
Sample All All All Non-OECD Commodity
countries exporters
Observations 6,750 6,750 6,744 5,502 4,115
R-squared 0.302 0.303 0.298 0.299 0.304
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Basic Specification with Bootstrapped Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.340** 0.336*** 0.324** 0.316***
(0.150) (0.125) (0.161) (0.112)
REPt 0.769*** 0.780*** 0.795*** 0.745***
(0.061) (0.120) (0.121) (0.106)
PAt -0.026** -0.026* -0.026* -0.024**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
∆logGWPt -0.519 1.835 1.755
(5.274) (3.879) (4.168)
∆logGDPUS,t -0.856 -0.809
(5.528) (3.679)
∆logOil Pricest 0.003
(0.002)
Sample All All All All
Observations 2,177 2,177 2,171 2,171
Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered in presidential mandate in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
47
